We investigate whether managers "hide" bad news by announcing earnings during periods of low attention, or by providing less forewarning of an upcoming earnings announcement. Our findings are consistent with managers reporting bad news after market hours, on busy days, and with less advance notice, and with earnings receiving less attention in these settings. Paradoxically, our findings indicate that managers also report bad news on Fridays, but we do not find lower attention on Fridays. Further, we find negative returns when the market is notified of an upcoming Friday earnings announcement, which is consistent with investors inferring forthcoming bad news.
! ! 2 to occasionally switch their EA timing for strategic purposes without raising alarm, consistent with the first condition.
We turn next to the second condition: that lulls and peaks in market attention must be exante predictable in order for managers to shift bad (good) news into times where the market is paying less (more) attention. We examine three specific times during which prior research has speculated that market attention differs: before versus after the close of regular trading hours; on Mondays through Thursdays versus Fridays; and on "slow" versus "busy" news days, based on the total number of firms that are reporting earnings. We employ four empirical proxies to investigate temporal variation in market attention: (i) the number of earnings-related news articles; (ii) the speed with which analysts incorporate the earnings news into future earnings forecasts; (iii) EDGAR 8-K downloads; and (iv) abnormal Google search volume. The advantage of these attention measures is that they are user-oriented, related to information processing, and measured on a timely basis.
Our findings are consistent with attention being lower (higher) after (before) market close and on busy (slow) reporting days. Specifically, EAs after trading hours (on the busiest reporting days) are associated with a 7% (12%) decrease in news articles, a 7% (4%) decrease in the speed with which analysts update forecasts, a 19% (30%) decrease in EDGAR downloads, and a 0% (2%) decrease in Google searches, after controlling for firm fixed effects, non-stationary firm characteristics, and the sign and magnitude of the earnings news. However, our analyses generally indicate that attention is actually no different on Fridays than other weekdays. We also tie together our first two conditions by showing that the act of switching EA timing (condition 1) does not draw unwanted attention to bad news (condition 2). In sum, the data are consistent with ! ! 4 hours or busy days, although we do observe a negative stock price drift in the interim period between the scheduling date and EA date.
We make several contributions to the academic literature. First, although it can be inferred from prior research that the existence of EA timing changes is non-zero, we contribute by quantifying how often changes occur, both in general as well as within a given firm. Further, we characterize changes in EA timing along several dimensions: by hour, by weekday, and in relation to the timing choices of other firms. We also provide evidence consistent with changes in EA timing not drawing the attention of market participants, an assumed condition that underlies prior research on strategic EA timing, but which has not been tested to date.
Our second contribution is to provide new and direct evidence on the existence of predictable variation in attention to EAs. We employ state-of-the-art proxies for market attention to investigate how and when attention to EAs appears to decline, and find evidence that adds to, confirms, and conflicts with the inferences from prior research. First, our evidence that market attention is lower after hours is new to the literature. Second, our evidence that market attention is lower on busy reporting days confirms Hirshleifer et al.'s (2009) Third, we contribute to the literature that investigates the determinants of managers' EA timing choices. Using an EA timing dataset that is larger and likely more precise than the data in previous studies, and using a comprehensive set of empirical tests, we find that earnings news does tend to be worse when released after hours, on Fridays, and on busy reporting days, as well ! ! 5 as when released with less lead-time. We also find evidence consistent with managers highlighting good news by reporting during periods of higher expected attention, a finding that is new to this literature.
Finally, we introduce new evidence on the scheduling of EAs. We find that shorter scheduling lead times are associated with both worse earnings surprises as well as reduced market attention, which is again consistent with the notion that managers can influence attention to earnings news. We also find evidence to suggest that the act of scheduling is itself news to the market, as the scheduling of an EA for a Friday is associated with a negative market reaction.
In sum, we conclude that managers are likely able to limit attention to negative news by announcing earnings after hours, on busy days, and with less advance notice. However, since we find that attention is no different on Friday than other weekdays, we conclude that the preponderance of bad news on Fridays is driven by either managers having incorrect beliefs about market attention, or by some other motivation.
Institutional Background, Prior Research, & Hypothesis Development
For the purposes of strategically timing the EA, an important question is: At what point does the manager know the earnings number? The answer to that question varies depending on the complexity of the firm and its quarter-end close process. However, the average firm closes the books quite rapidly. For example, KPMG (2012) reports that the average firm prepares a draft set of financial statements by five days after quarter-end, and Financial Executive Research Foundation ("FERF," 2013) reports that most firms have finished the close process within 10 days after quarter-end. However, the quarter-end is not a hard deadline-firms often monitor financial results on a monthly or even daily basis, so many firms likely have a reasonable prediction of the quarterly results even before quarter-end. FERF (2013) also notes that firms ! ! 6 often start preparing financial statements well in advance of quarter-end; e.g., Microsoft holds its first meeting to plan the financial statements for quarter t starting the day after the EA for quarter t-1.
After the consolidated financial results are drafted, the financial reporting team meets to review financial results and collaborate on the earnings press release. For example, Accenture finalizes the financials and tables approximately eight days after fiscal close, after which the team meets to discuss and sign-off on the EA (FERF 2013) . During these meetings, the CEO and team often decide on the timing of the EA, which is in part determined by executive schedules, competitor EA schedules, other corporate events, and the company's EA timing history. This timeline is borne out in our EA scheduling data (discussed below), which indicates that the median firm does not schedule their EA date/time until 14 days before the actual EA (or roughly 2 weeks after quarter-end), and 88% of firms do not schedule their EA until after quarter-end.
In summary, the timeline of events for many companies proceeds with the closing of the books, the preparation of the financials within 5-10 days, followed by the scheduling of the EA.
Thus, it seems likely that most firms are aware of their earnings news before deciding upon a date and time for its release, which allows for the possibility of strategic EA timing.
Incentives for hiding bad news and highlighting good news
In today's information-rich environment, the idea that public companies can "hide" earnings news is potentially difficult to grasp. At the same time, though, limited attention theory predicts that the enormous amount of information available in recent years likely makes it easier for managers to hide bad news among the clutter (Hirshleifer et al 2009; Lim and Teoh 2010) .
Moreover, the cost of changing EA timing is likely very low (e.g., press wire fees do not vary depending on the time of the day), so a manager will likely do so even if he expects that it has ! ! 7 only a small chance of being effective at altering attention. In this section, we provide several reasons why managers likely would want to limit (attract) attention to bad (good) earnings news, and why managers might have some expectation of getting away with it.
One incentive for managers to reduce (attract) attention to bad (good) news is that doing so might influence market price responses, at least in the short term. Anecdotal evidence indicates that inattention is associated with prices that do not fully impound all available public information (Huberman and Regev 2001) . Lim and Teoh (2010) speculate that some market anomalies such as post earnings announcement drift are potentially attributable to variation in market attentiveness. Moreover, even though managers likely understand that any pricing impact will be short-lived, they likely prefer gradual rather than sudden price declines because the latter can lead to negative media attention, price drops, and trading halts. Further, prior research shows that severe price drops increase the likelihood of shareholder litigation (Donelson et al. 2012) .
Even if there is no pricing benefit of increasing/decreasing attention to earnings news, other potential benefits are likely, such as career concerns, reputation management, and liquidity.
First, several prior studies find that CEOs that have a strong reputation with external media benefit from better career outcomes such as higher compensation and more invitations to join boards (Milbourn 2003; Falato et al. 2013; Rajgopal et al. 2006; Malmendier and Tate 2009) .
Further, Farrell and Whidbee (2002) find that forced CEO turnover after poor performance is higher among firms with greater media coverage. A logical extension is that CEOs with greater visibility (whether from media coverage or other exposure) have better career outcomes. Thus, managers have an incentive to maximize the dissemination of good news and limit the dissemination of bad news so as to enhance their reputations and career prospects. Second, managers may be saving face from the judgment of other stakeholders. Blankespoor and deHaan ! ! 8 (2015) discuss how stakeholders other than investors likely use media coverage as a signal of the quality of the firm and its CEO, so a positive media presence benefits the firm when transacting with such stakeholders. For example, skilled workers such as computer scientists may use media coverage as a signal of the quality of the firm or CEO, in which case firms with positive media coverage benefit from stronger employee demand. Finally, Barber and Odean (2008) discuss how some investors are more likely to trade in stocks that have first caught their attention. A logical extension of this argument is that investors will be less (more) likely to purchase stocks about which they have heard negative (good) news. Thus, even if prices are unaffected by individual traders, there is a plausible liquidity implication if EA timing affects market attention.
Prevalence of Earnings Announcement Timing Changes
There are a number of reasons to expect that EA times are relatively constant quarterafter-quarter. First, managers have a preference for being consistent with precedent in their voluntary disclosures (Graham et al. 2005; Chen and Mohan 1994; FERF 2013 ). This preference is most likely driven by an expectation that changing the announcement timing between periods will be interpreted as signaling something about the firm's earnings news. Several research firms make efforts to forecast in advance the predicted date of EA.
2 In addition, there is evidence that markets respond negatively when firms delay an expected reporting date (Chambers and Penman 1984 , Bagnoli et al. 2002 , Duarte-Silva et al. 2013 , So 2014 , suggesting that investors form expectations not only for the earnings news, but also for the timing of the earnings news release.
Finally, Graham et al. (2005) find that 53% of surveyed executives "give no preferential treatment to disclosing good or bad news faster" (page 63).
On the other hand, there are also a number of reasons to expect that EA times are highly variable. Research has also found evidence consistent with managers both accelerating and delaying EA timing for strategic purposes. Skinner (1994 Skinner ( , 1997 , Donelson et al. (2012) , and Bowen et al. (1992) find evidence consistent with managers accelerating bad news releases to reduce litigation risk, minimize sharp price drops, and avoid negative reputation consequences from withholding information. To the contrary, other papers find evidence consistent with managers delaying the release of bad earnings news, possibly in order to further validate the data, to allow insiders to sell shares, or with the hopes that offsetting good news will come to light (Kross 1981 , Kothari et al. 2009 , Chambers and Penman 1984 , Kross and Schroeder 1984 , Begley and Fischer 1998 , Bagnoli et al. 2002 . Further, Chen and Mohan (1994) report that more than a third of survey respondents said they would change an EA date depending on the nature of the earnings news. However, as noted above, the most common reasons for changing the timing of EAs are likely benign, simply reflecting calendar conflicts or administrative conflicts. For example, IBM reports that, "earnings are announced on the fifteenth or sixteenth working day…" but that "the date of the EA can vary, because generally we will not make the announcement on a Friday, a Monday, or on a holiday" (FERF 2013, page 12) .
Frequent, benign changes in EA timing are precisely the camouflage needed for managers to strategically change the EA timing. We put forth the following hypothesis about EA timing across periods where variation in market attention is thought to exist: H1: Quarter after quarter, firms announce earnings news: at the same time of day; on the same weekday; and on similarly busy reporting days.
Variation in Market Attention
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Prior research has posited that, at some point, the limited capabilities of humans to acquire and process information prevent them from absorbing the complete set of public information, in what is referred to as market "inattention" or "distraction" (see Lim and Teoh (2010) for a review).
3 Patell and Wolfson (1982) , among others, speculate that EAs that occur in the evening might receive less attention than similar news that is released earlier in the day. The premise for this speculation is presumably that market participants are not working once the market closes, or that they are distracted by other issues. However, Patell and Wolfson (1982) also note that the opposite could be true: that EAs in the evening could receive greater attention as more time is allowed for dissemination and interpretation before trading begins the following day. We investigate the following hypothesis (in the null form):
H2a: Attention to earnings is the same after market hours as during or before market hours.
DellaVigna and Pollett (2009) and Damodaran (1989) , among others, theorize that market participants are distracted just before the weekend and, as a result, EAs on a Friday receive less attention than similar EAs on Monday through Thursday. However, because relatively few firms release earnings on Friday (in our sample, just 7.6 percent occur on a Friday), it is plausible that each individual announcement receives more attention than announcements on other days of the week. Further, the idea that market participants are systematically inattentive on Fridays is inconsistent with the work patterns for the typical
investment banker, money manager, or analyst, who often work long hours and weekends. Thus, there are reasons both for and against expecting lower market attention on Friday.
Prior research has used the earnings-return relation to examine variation in market attention. For example, DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) 
We raise several concerns about drawing a causal link between attention and stock price responses. First, the interpretation of lower earnings response coefficients (ERCs) as evidence of reduced attention assumes that market frictions and/or behavioral biases prevent other undistracted arbitrageurs and algorithmic traders from eliminating under-reactions by distracted investors. Second, to the extent that ERCs do in fact capture attention, it derives primarily from equity investors; the attention of other important market participants known to improve market efficiency, such as analysts and the business press, is ignored using an ERC methodology. Finally, Kothari (2001) explains several shortcomings in ERC methodologies and discusses the possibility for correlated omitted variables. Note that Melessa (2012) also finds evidence that lower Friday ERCs are likely not driven by lower attention, but rather by macroeconomic uncertainty. Accordingly, in Table IA .12 we present evidence that the result found in prior research of lower ERCs on Fridays is highly sensitive to empirical design choices, and that the lower ERCs on Fridays are likely driven by unobserved characteristics of the earnings news, and that market responses to other information announcements (i.e., analyst forecast revisions) are no different on Fridays than other days.
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season" is highly anticipated and report dates are often known in advance, market participants arrange their schedules such that they can pay adequate attention to numerous firms' announcements. It is therefore plausible that there is equal or even greater attention paid to EAs on busy days relative to periods of low information flow, in which case the differential market responses on busy days are again driven by non-attention causes. As with above, we use alternative measures of market inattention to investigate H2c:
H2c: Attention to earnings is the same on days with many EAs as it is on days with few EAs.
Strategic Timing of Earnings News
Prior evidence is mixed on whether managers choose an EA time depending on the content of the news (e.g., Patell and Wolfson (1982) ; Damodaran (1989) EA timing is voluntary. Thus, if managers prefer to hide (highlight) bad (good) earnings news, they likely alter their EA timing in an attempt to take advantage of any possible differences in market attention. Specifically, we predict that managers will time bad (good) news for release in periods when they expect attention to be lower (higher). We also note that, if the cost of changing announcement timing is sufficiently low, managers will likely do so even if the expected probability of receiving different attention is low. Our hypotheses in the null form are as follows:
H3: Earnings news is no different: after market hours than it is earlier in the day; on Friday than it is on Monday through Thursday; and on days with many EAs than it is on days with few EAs.
Sample Construction
Because the mixed results in the prior literature could be attributed to challenges in measuring EA timing, our objective is to construct a sample of EA days and times that is as accurate as possible. To do so, we obtain EA timing data from four independent sourcesCompustat, IBES, RavenPack and Wall Street Horizon-and retain only those observations for which the EA days and times can be validated by at least two sources.
5 Information on the sample selection is shown in We use three sources to obtain data on EA times. Our first source of the announcement time stamp is IBES. 7 Our second source is RavenPack's database of news articles that appear in
Wall Street Journal (all editions), Dow Jones Newswires, and Barron's. For each EA date, we
locate in RavenPack the firm's press release or the first news article written specifically about the firm's earnings. 8 The time stamp of the press release or first news article is our second source of the EA time. Our third source of EA times is from Wall Street Horizon, although these data are only available after 2005. 9 For our descriptive analysis of EA times, we require that the before/during/after-hours timing classification can be corroborated by at least two data sources.
This criteria eliminates 41,379 observations, leaving a sample of 151,106 observations for our descriptive analysis of intraday announcements.
For our statistical tests, we drop 47,431 observations that do not have the control variables used in the regression tests below. 10 We also drop observations that have an absolute earnings surprise that exceeds the stock price, that have a stock price below $1 at period-end, that announce earnings more than 90 days after the fiscal period-end (which is the longest SEC reporting deadline during our sample period), or that do not have news coverage data. Our statistical analysis focuses on a binary classification of announcements before versus after the close of trading hours (as opposed to before/during/after-hours), so for our statistical tests we only require that before versus after market close timing classification can be corroborated by at least two data sources. The refined test sample includes 120,165 firm-quarter observations.
Figure 1 provides descriptive information on intra-day and intra-week distributions of EAs. As depicted in Panel A, 34.6% of announcements happen immediately before U.S. market trading hours (i.e., 9:30am to 4:00pm; all times Eastern), while 45.4% happen immediately after trading hours. Just 7% of EAs happen during trading hours, on average. The remaining 13% of
EAs happen early in the morning (i.e., before 7am) or late at night (after 6:30pm). Panel B shows that these percentages change over time -the proportion of firms announcing during trading hours decreases monotonically from 21.5% in 2000 to just 2.2% in 2011. Panel C shows that the frequency of EAs per day increases from 14.4% on Mondays to 30.5% on Thursdays, followed by a decline to just 7.6% on Fridays. Wall Street Horizon also tracks the dates on which firms announce the scheduling of their EA. 12 We refer to these dates as "scheduling" dates, and we refer to the number of days between the scheduling date and the EA date as the scheduling "lead-time. Table 1 . 13 Several insights are worth mentioning. The average lead-time is 15.7 days, which is on average 17.3 days
In Table IA .7, we split the observations into good and bad earnings news and re-plot the graphs in Figure 1 . There is some visual evidence of a higher frequency of negative earnings unexpected earnings on Fridays and in the busiest reporting decile. However, the plots ignore the magnitude of the earnings news as well as covariates and, thus, should be interpreted with caution. 12 Wall Street Horizon obtains most scheduling announcements from firms' press releases or websites, but some are obtained via direct communication with the firm. Wall Street Horizon considers a scheduled EA date to be "verified" only when the reporting firm describes the date as being final. All predicted or estimated EA timings are labeled "tentative." For our analysis we retain only announcements of "verified" EA timings because we are interested in final announcement timings that are chosen by the firm, not timings that are predicted by outsiders. Wall Street Horizon sells its scheduling data on a real-time basis to clients to inform investing decisions. 13 The underlying numbers for this figure are reported in Table IA .10.
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after the fiscal quarter-end. There are also concentrations of schedulings at 7, 14, and 21 days before the announcement, consistent with managers setting scheduling goals on weekly intervals.
3.4% of EAs are not scheduled until the day of the actual EA, 26.2% of schedulings occur within 7 days of the EA, and just 8% of schedulings occur more than 30 days before the EA. Finally, 87.9% of schedulings occur after the fiscal quarter-end. Thus, it appears likely that most managers have a reasonable understanding of their earnings news at the time when the EA is scheduled.
Empirical Design and Results
All of the variables discussed below are defined in Appendix A. Summary statistics for the main control variables are presented in Panel B of Table 1 . Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Sample sizes vary across tests depending on data availability.
Analysis of Hypotheses 1 -Changes in Earnings Announcement Timing
EA timing is identified along three dimensions: time of day; day of the week; and how "busy" the EA day is. Like Hirschleifer et al. (2009), we proxy for how busy a reporting day is by counting EAs per day on Compustat, sorted into deciles within our sample by calendar year.
We label this variable EAFREQ (as opposed to counts of EAs by week, as used in Figure 2 ). 14 Panels A, B, and C of Table 2 present quarter-over-quarter transition matrices of EA times. Between any two consecutive quarters: 15% of firms change their before/during/after trading hours timing; 52.8% of firms change their EA weekday; and 80.5% change their EAFREQ decile. Over the entire sample period, 72.6% of our sample firms have at least one
change in before/during/after hours timing and 99% of firms have at least one change in EAFREQ decile. Further, 51.4% of firms have at least one Friday EA during our sample period, which is unexpected given that only 7.6% of all EAs happen on a Friday. Panel D of Table 2 presents frequencies of announcement timing changes within each fiscal year. Within any given year: 25.6% of firms have at least one change in before/during/after market timing; 81.6% of firms have at least one change in EA weekday; and 98.8% of firms have at least one change in EAFREQ decile. In summary, the results in Table 2 indicate that changes in EA timing happen frequently enough that strategic changes likely do not draw the attention of market participants.
Statistical tests linking changes in announcement timing and changes in attention are discussed below.
Analysis of Hypotheses 2 -Differences in Market Attention
We define attention simply as a user taking notice of a piece of information. We employ four measures of market attention (collectively ATTN), each of which has been vetted in prior research (e.g., Barber and Odean 2008; Da et al. 2011; Drake, Roulstone and Thornock 2012; Drake, Roulstone and Thornock 2015; Zhang 2008) . 15 Our ATTN proxies have several strengths.
First, our measures are focused on the user, in that they measure the actions and/or choices of information users-if a user is taking action with respect to an EA, we assume that he/she is paying attention to it. Second, each measure is related to either the production of information (as in the case of news articles and analyst revisions) or the acquisition of information (as in the case of 8-K downloads and Google searches), which allows us to speak to what information market participants pay attention to. Third, these variables are measured on a timely basis, which makes them superior to less timely measures of attention such as quarterly advertising expense (e.g.,
Chemmanur and Yan 2009). Fourth, unlike measures such as stock returns or trading volume, our ATTN variables do not rely assumptions of market equilibrium -an assumption that is debatable in tests of behavioral biases such as limited attention. 16 Finally, also unlike stock returns and trading volume, our proxies measure the attention of multiple types of market participants, which may differ from the attention of equity investors.
Attention Proxies
The first proxy for attention, NEWSCOUNT, is the log of the number of earnings-specific news articles that appear in the RavenPack database within the 24-hour period starting with the firm's EA. 17, 18 The logic for NEWSCOUNT is that the number of published articles correlates with the breadth of earnings news dissemination (i.e., fewer articles mean that fewer readers learn about the earnings news) as well as the depth of news dissemination (i.e., even those market participants who learn about the earnings news will acquire less information when fewer news articles are available) (Barber and Odean 2008; Li et al. 2011 ).
Our second proxy, ANALYST_SPD, is the speed with which equity analysts impound earnings news into their future forecasts, in the spirit of Zhang (2008) . Our intuition underlying this proxy is that greater analyst attention is associated with faster forecast updates. During times
Using equilibrium-based measures of market activity as measures of attention requires that prices move when investors pay attention and/or that investors actually trade as a result of their increased attention. However, price movements and trading volume can occur in the absence of attention (e.g., market orders), and investors can pay attention to a stock and decide not to trade. 17 There are four advantages of sourcing news data from RavenPack instead of other databases used in the literature: (i) RavenPack identifies articles that are written specifically about the firm's earnings, so we are able to reduce noise by excluding other articles about the firm; (ii) the RavenPack database includes articles from several major news sources, whereas prior papers have sometimes used only a single source; (iii) the RavenPack database allows us to quickly calculate the number of articles written about a firm, whereas competing databases (e.g., Factiva) restrict most users to manually downloading 100 articles at a time; and (iv) RavenPack takes steps to reduce the incidence of double-counting articles. Drake, Guest and Twedt (2014) find that RavenPack coverage and Factiva coverage are correlated at 0.70 among a randomly selected sample of EAs. 18 We also consider subtracting from NEWSCOUNT the average number of earnings-specific articles that appear over the previous 7 weeks, but the average is zero for nearly all firm-quarters. Untabulated analysis using such a measure of "abnormal" NEWSCOUNT produces qualitatively and quantitatively similar results. Untabulated results using all available news articles in Ravenpack (i.e., not just earnings-specific news) also produce similar results.
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when analysts are distracted, we assume that it will take them longer to update their future forecasts. 19 We use the IBES detail file to collect data on all the analyst forecasts, j, that are updated within 30 days of the firm's EA. We then calculate the number of weekdays between the EA and forecast update. The inverse of the average of these lags measures how quickly analysts update their forecasts following the EA. Specifically, we calculate analyst updating speed, ANALYST_SPD, as follows:
The third measure of market attention is based on the number of 8-K downloads from EDGAR (e.g., Drake et al 2015) . We measure investor EDGAR activity on EA days relative to that on other days. Thus, this measure is a proxy for attention to firm-specific earnings news. We compute abnormal EDGAR downloads as follows:
The first term is the sum of EDGAR 8-K downloads for two days around the EA (days 0, 1), while the second term is the trailing average EDGAR 8-K downloads for the same two weekdays over the preceding seven weeks. EDGAR data are available for the period 2008-2011.
Our final measure of market attention is Google search volume that occurs around the EA for a given firm's stock ticker, following Da et al. (2011) and Drake, Jennings, Roulstone, and Thornock (2013) . The intuition underlying this proxy is that as a market participant searches the internet for firm-specific information, they are paying attention to the stock. Data on weekly Google search volume for firms' stock tickers is obtained from Google Trends, following the methodology in Drake, Jennings, Roulstone, and Thornock (2013) . Google Trends reports a normalized measure of the number of searches for a given search term. We calculate abnormal Google search volume as follows:
where w is the week of the EA. 22 We use a two-week event period as data are on a weekly basis and using a one-week period would not capture any post-announcement attention from Friday NEWSCOUNT likely most directly correlates with media attention. ANALYST_SPD is likely a direct measure of analyst attention, and Da et al. (2011) find that GOOGHITS is likely most
For brevity, we refer readers to Drake, Jennings, Roulstone and Thornock (2013) for a detailed description the Google Trends index. Note that we follow Da et al. (2011) in using weekly (as opposed to daily) Google search data to maximize the sample size. 23 An unavoidable consequence of having only weekly data is that EAs that happen early in the week have a shorter (longer) pre-announcement (post-announcement) window than do EAs that happen later in the week.
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directly related to retail investor attention. EDGAR likely captures earnings-related attention from multiple types of market participants. 
Regression Tests of H2
We use the following regression to examine market attention for the three EA timing dimensions:
AFTER is a binary variable equal to one for EAs from 4pm to midnight. FRIDAY is a binary variable for EAs on Friday. EAFREQ is the decile of the number of market-wide EAs that happen on day t. β 1 , β 2 , and β 3 < 0 would be consistent with attention being lower after hours, on
Fridays, and on busy reporting days, respectively. These negative coefficients would be simultaneously consistent with attention being higher before market close, on Mondays through Thursdays, and on slow reporting days. 
Our tests are agnostic as to whether variation in attention can alter stock prices responses (i.e., ERCs). Still, we provide evidence on the relation between our ATTN proxies and stock prices in Table 3 presents results of estimating equation (4). Column 1, in which NEWSCOUNT is the dependent variable, shows that the coefficients on EAFREQ and AFTER are significantly negative, and that the coefficient on FRIDAY is insignificant. The coefficient of -0.073 on AFTER indicates that, ceteris paribus, there are 7.3% fewer articles written about earnings that are reported after trading hours relative to before or during trading hours. The coefficient of -0.012 on EAFREQ indicates that a one decile increase in EAFREQ is associated with 1.2% fewer news articles or, equivalently, a move from the slowest to busiest decile of days is associated with a (1.2% x 10 =) 12% decrease in news articles. The results for ANALYST_SPD in column 2 are consistent with the NEWSCOUNT results. The results for EDGAR are presented in the third column-the negative coefficients on AFTER and EAFREQ are again consistent with lower attention after hours and on busy days, while the positive coefficient on FRIDAY is consistent with relatively higher attention on Fridays. Finally, for GOOGHITS (column 4), the coefficients on AFTER and FRIDAY are insignificant, while that on EAFREQ is significantly negative.
Clustering by both date and firm produces substantially unchanged results, which is consistent with our implicit assumption that the residuals in estimating equation (4) are not serially correlated (i.e., any serial correlation is largely unchanging over our sample period and, thus, effectively removed via the firm fixed effects). 27 Table IA .9 of the Internet Appendix presents regression results with interactions between AFTER, FRIDAY, and EAFREQ. The interaction terms are largely insignificant, indicating that the effects are additive rather than interactive.
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In sum, the four ATTN proxies generally indicate that market attention is lower (higher) after hours and on busy days (before market close and on slow days). However, the results show that FRIDAY is either not associated with attention or is positively associated with attention.
The logic underlying H1 is that the act of switching EA timing must not raise concerns and attract attention. Next, we examine whether changes in EA timing (H1) are associated with different attention (H2):
If attention is lower after hours, on Fridays, and on busy days, we still expect the coefficients on AFTER, FRIDAY, and EAFREQ to be negative. The bolded coefficients on β 2 , β 4 , and β 6 are new from equation (4) and capture the incremental difference in ATTN for firms that switch their timing from the previous quarter. We focus on the sum of coefficients on the EA timing variables (e.g. β 1 + β 2 ) in each regression to capture whether overall attention is lower during the predicted times. For example, (β 1 + β 2 ) < 0 indicates that firms that switch to after-hours still obtain less attention than if they reported before hours, even if β 2 > 0 unto itself. Table 4 presents results of estimating equation (5). In column 1 for NEWSCOUNT, the coefficient on AFTER is still significantly negative, which (like the results in Table 3 ) is consistent with reduced attention for after-hours announcements. More to the point in linking H1
and H2, the coefficient sum of AFTER + ΔAFTER is significantly negative, which is consistent with the notion that even those firms that switch into after-hours timing receive less attention than if they had reported earlier in the day. Said differently, the results indicate that the act of switching does not generate excess attention that offsets the lower attention firms otherwise receive when reporting after hours. Similarly, the coefficient sum of EAFREQ and ΔEAFREQ is ! ! 24 significantly negative, indicating that firms switching to busier days attract less attention than if they had reported on a slow day. The individual and summed coefficients for FRIDAY and ΔFRIDAY are insignificant, suggesting that firms switching to Fridays receive no different attention than if they had reported other days of the week. The results for ANALYST_SPD, EDGAR, and GOOGHITS in columns 2 through 4 are largely the same as those for NEWSCOUNT. Again, the overall results are consistent with attention being lower after hours and on busy days, both for switching firms and non-switching firms. However, Friday announcers receive no different or even higher attention, depending on the model specification.
Analysis of H3 -Strategic Timing of Earnings News
H3 posits that managers will strategically time the release of earnings news in an attempt to hide bad news or highlight good news. We use unexpected earnings (UE) to proxy for good versus bad news. 28 As shown in Panel B of Table 1 , average UE is -0.001, or -0.1% of price.
Our hypothesis is that managers strategically choose the timing of the EA based on the earnings news, which could be tested by regressing TIMING on UE and control variables. A concern with such an analysis is that AFTER, FRIDAY, and EAFREQ are not chosen in isolation from one another, as would be implied by estimating separate models. Rather, Chen and Mohan (1994) find evidence to suggest that managers choose these timing variables simultaneously; for example, by releasing bad news after hours and on a busy day. In order to consider these timing choices simultaneously, our tests involve OLS "reverse regressions" in which UE is the dependent variable and AFTER, FRIDAY, and EAFREQ are included as independent variables: 
All variables are as previously defined. Standard errors are again clustered by EA date. 30 If managers strategically time lower (higher) UE to be released after hours, on Fridays, and on busy days (and vice versa), we expect the coefficients β 1 through β 3 to be negative.
We also estimate a changes version of equation (6) to link H1 and H3, i.e., that changes in EA timing, as predicted in H1, are associated with changes in earnings news, as predicted in H3. The changes specification is the same as the levels specification in equation (6) We report the results of estimating equation (6) in Table 5 . The first (second) column reports the results using a levels (changes) form. We find that, across both the levels and changes specifications, the coefficients on AFTER, FRIDAY and EAFREQ are significantly negative. As compared to the unconditional average UE of -0.001, the negative AFTER coefficient of -0.0007 in column 1 of Panel C indicates that UE tend to be (-0.0007/-0.001 =) 70% worse after hours than average. The negative FRIDAY coefficient of -0.0019 indicates that UE tend to be (-0.0019/-0.001 =) 190% worse on Fridays, and the negative EAFREQ coefficient of -0.0001
indicates that UE decrease by (-0.0001/-0.001 =) 10% for each one-decile increase in EAFREQ.
The negative results for AFTER and EAFREQ are consistent with condition 3 -that earnings news tends to be worse during periods of lower market attention. The negative signs on 
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FRIDAY, indicating that worse news is reported on Fridays, are somewhat unexpected since we found the attention to be no different or even higher on Friday than Monday through Thursday.
A likely explanation for this finding is that managers perceive attention to be lower on Fridays, but in fact, market participants exhibit no lower attention on Fridays than other days of the week.
In summary, we believe that our finding that attention is higher on Fridays, even though earnings news is more negative on Fridays is an important contribution as it suggests that managers' ex ante perceptions of market attention can be different than ex post realizations.
Highlighting Good News -Further Analysis
In this section, we more directly test the idea that managers highlight good news. The test follows the changes form of equation (6), except that we now separately identify the timing changes to hide bad news (i.e., going from periods of perceived high attention to periods of perceived low attention) from the timing changes to highlight good news (i.e., going from periods of perceived low attention to periods of perceived high attention). Specifically, we create binary variables, ΔTIMING_HIDE, that are equal to one when the firm switches to after hours from before hours, to Friday from Monday -Thursday, or to a busier day from a slower day. Similar, we create binary variables, ΔTIMING_HIGHLIGHT, that are equal to one when the firm switches from after to before hours, from Friday to Monday -Thursday, or from busier to slower days. We expect that the coefficients on ΔTIMING_HIDE to be negative if managers switch from perceived high to low attention to hide bad news. We expect the coefficients on ΔTIMING_HIGHLIGHT to be positive if managers switch from perceived low to high attention to highlight good news.
Regression results are reported in Table 6 and the evidence is consistent with highlighting good news, as well as with hiding bad earnings news. Specifically, the coefficients on ! ! 27 ΔAFTER_HIGHLIGHT, ΔFRIDAY_HIGHLIGHT, and ΔEAFREQ_HIGHLIGHT are positive and significant, while the coefficients on ΔAFTER_HIDE, ΔFRIDAY_HIDE, and ΔEAFREQ_HIDE are negative. This evidence is the first in the literature to separate out the idea that managers highlight good news.
Analysis of EA scheduling announcements
Earnings announcement scheduling lead-time strategy
Managers likely consider numerous strategies in determining how and when to report their earnings. Thus far we have focused on EA timing choices, but another plausible way to reduce (increase) attention to earnings news is to decrease (increase) the amount of advance warning provided before the EA. In this section, we investigate whether EA timing "lead-times" are associated with attention and UE. 31 First, we augment equation (4) by regressing the ATTN variables on the timing variables and on a lead-time variable, LEAD_TIME, computed as the logged lead-time (in days) between the scheduling date and EA date. An estimated coefficient on LEAD_TIME > 0 would indicate the decreases (increases) in scheduling lead-time is associated with less (more) attention.
Columns (1) through (4) of Table 7 report the results of this test. The coefficient estimates for AFTER, FRIDAY, and EAFREQ are largely unchanged from the previous analysis. The coefficient for LEAD_TIME is significantly positive for ANALYST_SPD and EDGAR, which is consistent with earnings news receiving less (more) attention when less (more) advance warning is provided.
Another possible strategy would be to delay bad news EAs in the hopes of being able to bundle the bad news with offsetting good news (Kothari et al. 2009 ). Analysis in Table IA .14 of the Internet Appendix provides little evidence of a strategy that bundles earnings news and management forecasts, or of a significant interaction between earnings news, manager forecast news, and TIMING choices.
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Second, we examine whether the content of the earnings news varies with lead-time.
Panel B of Figure 3 plots average UE depending on how many days' lead-time is provided, and shows a pattern that shorter lead-times are associated with more negative earnings surprises.
32
The results in column (5) of Table 7 report the results of a regression of UE on LEAD_TIME.
The model and controls are the same as the levels regression in Table 4 , except that LEAD_TIME is now also included. The coefficients on AFTER, FRIDAY, and EAFREQ are similar to those in Table 4 , except that the AFTER coefficient is no longer significant in this smaller sample. The positive LEAD_TIME coefficient is consistent with managers providing shorter lead-times for bad news. Overall, the data are generally consistent with a relation between the scheduled leadtime and both market attention and earnings news.
Returns to scheduling announcements
In this section, we investigate whether investors respond negatively (positively) to expected bad (good) news at the time when a firm schedules its EA for after hours, on Friday, or for a busy day (or vice versa). Table 8 tabulates results of regressing abnormal returns from around the EA scheduling date on AFTER, FRIDAY, and EAFREQ. We include our usual firm controls, firm fixed effects, and year fixed effects (i.e., as in Table 4 ). Where available, we also control for whether the firm's scheduled EA date is before or after the announcement date previously predicted by Wall Street Horizon (binary variable DELAY) as well as the number of days between the scheduled announcement date and the previous tentative date (continuous variable DELAY_AMOUNT). DELAY and DELAY_AMOUNT are included to control for whether the firm's scheduled EA date represents a delay or acceleration from the market's expected date,
which is known to be an indicator of bad or good news, respectively (So 2014) . 33 We also control for the scheduling lead-time and include an indicator for whether the scheduling took place after quarter-end. Standard errors are clustered by scheduling date.
Column (1) of Table 8 has three-day abnormal returns around the scheduling date as the dependent variable, calculated as the firm's buy-and-hold return less the value-weighted market return. The FRIDAY coefficient is significantly negative, and is consistent with a 28 basis point negative return upon the scheduling of an EA for a Friday. The results for AFTER and EAFREQ are insignificant. Column (2) is similar to (1) but only includes scheduling announcements that occur after quarter-end, a setting in which the manager likely has a more precise estimate of the earnings news at the point of the scheduling -the results are qualitatively unchanged. Thus, market participants appear to infer that EAs scheduled for Fridays tend to contain negative news, but not so for announcements scheduled for after hours or on busy days.
In columns (3) and (4), we calculate long-window abnormal returns starting one day before the scheduling date and ending one day before the EA. Here, the scheduling returns are negative for all three timing variables, AFTER, FRIDAY, and EAFREQ, which is consistent with either investors gradually inferring negative news from the scheduled EA date/time, or with investors learning about the negative news from other sources prior to the EA. Overall, we interpret these results as further corroboration that announcements after hours, on Fridays, and on busy days tend to contain negative news, and vice versa.
Conclusion
Wall Street Horizon maintains a two-year calendar of predicted EA dates. Dates that are predicted by Wall Street Horizon's algorithm are labeled as "tentative." We employ Wall Street Horizon's "tentative" date as a proxy for the market's expectation for earnings schedule timing. Our DELAY proxies are likely imprecise to the extent that Wall Street Horizon's expectations are not representative of average market expectations.
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We posit and test three conditions that are necessary to support the theory that managers strategically time EAs to hide bad news or highlight good news: (i) managers must change their EA timing frequently enough that to do so would not attract unwanted attention; (ii) there must be ex-ante predictable variation in market attention; and (iii) earnings news must be worse (better) during periods of expected lower (higher) market attention. Our findings support condition 1 -firms frequently change the timing of their EAs between days of the week, before and after hours, and on busy versus slow reporting days. We find evidence to both support and contradict condition 2; that is, our results are consistent with attention being lower after hours and on busy days, but not on Fridays. With regards to condition 3, we provide new evidence that earnings news indeed tends to be worse (better) during periods of expected low (high) attention.
In our final analysis, we find that shortening the advance notice of a forthcoming EA both results in lower attention and is indicative of worse earnings news, and we also find that equity investors respond negatively to the announcement that an EA will take place on a Friday.. Collectively, our results shine new light on the long-standing question: do managers "hide" bad earnings news by announcing during periods of low market attention? And similarly, do managers "highlight" good news by announcing during periods of higher market attention? In short, our evidence is consistent with managers taking advantage of low (high) attention after hours and on busy days (before close of trading and on slower days) to release unfavorable (favorable) earnings news. However, given that attention is the same or higher on Fridays than other days, it is unlikely that managers are able to effectively hide bad news by reporting immediately prior to the weekend. Instead, the preponderance of bad news on Fridays is possibly due to managers incorrectly perceiving attention as lower on Friday. ATTN is NEWSCOUNT, ANALYST_SPD, EDGAR, or GOOGHITS in columns 1 through 4, respectively. AFTER is a binary variable equal to one for EAs from 4pm to midnight. FRIDAY is a binary variable equal to one for EAs on Friday. EAFREQ is the decile of the number of EAs that happen on day t. FIRM are firm fixed effects. YEAR are year fixed effects. CONTROLS are listed below and detailed in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by EA date. *** Indicates significance at 1%; ** at 5%; and * at 10%, two-tailed.
(1) ATTN is NEWSCOUNT, ANALYST_SPD, EDGAR, or GOOGHITS in columns 1 through 4, respectively. AFTER is a binary variable equal to one for EAs from 4pm to midnight. FRIDAY is a binary variable equal to one for EAs on Friday. EAFREQ is the decile of the number of EAs that happen on day t. Δ is the change operator. CONTROLS, which are the same variables reported in Table 3 and detailed in Appendix A, are untabulated for brevity. FIRM are firm fixed effects. YEAR are year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by EA date. *** Indicates significance at 1%; ** at 5%; and * at 10%, two-tailed.
(1) ΔAFTER_HIDE is a binary variable equal to one for firms that switch from before hours in the prior quarter to after hours in the current quarter. ΔAFTER_HIGHLIGHT is a binary variable equal to one for firms that switch from after hours to before hours. ΔFRIDAY_HIDE is a binary variable for firms that switch from Monday-Thursday to Friday, and ΔFRIDAY_HIGHLIGHT is a binary for firms that switch from Friday to Monday-Thursday. ΔEAFREQ_HIDE is a binary for firms that increase in EAFREQ by more than two deciles from the prior quarter. ΔEAFREQ_HIGHLIGHT is a binary for firms that decrease in EAFREQ by more than two deciles. CONTROLS are the same as in Table 5 and are untabulated for brevity. Standard errors are clustered by EA date and by firm. The bottom rows present differences in the absolute value of the ΔTIMING_HIDE and ΔTIMING_HIGHLIGHT coefficient estimates. *** Indicates significance at 1%; ** at 5%; and * at 10%.
( Table 3  Table 3  Table 3  Table 3  Table 4 ! ! CAR is cumulative abnormal return in the three-day period around the EA scheduling announcement (in columns (1) and (2) or cumulative abnormal return from one day before the scheduling announcement through one day before the actual EA (in columns (3) and (4)). AFTER is a binary variable equal to one for EAs from 4pm to midnight. FRIDAY is a binary variable equal to one for EAs on Friday. EAFREQ is the decile of the number of EAs that happen on day t. FIRM are firm fixed effects. YEAR are year fixed effects. CONTROLS are listed below and detailed in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by scheduling date. *** Indicates significance at 1%; ** at 5%; and * at 10%, two-tailed. Columns (1) and (2) include all observations. Columns (3) and (4) only include scheduling announcements that occur after quarter-end.
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